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Abstract: Recent literature on financial development and growth has highlighted the 
possibility of endogenous business cycles arising for particular levels of a given credit 
multiplier. These studies concentrate on loans directed to the productive activity and 
neglect the role of credit to consumption. In this note, we consider an endogenous growth 
model, where a representative agent must choose how to allocate credit; basically, the agent 
considers a simple rule where the share of credit to consumption reacts to deviations of the 
consumption – wealth ratio relatively to the corresponding steady state level. The setup 
generates nonlinear dynamics, which are analyzed both locally and globally. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Beginning with the pioneer work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983), the issue of 
constraints to credit has progressively gained a place of its own in the study of 
macroeconomics. It is crucial to recognize and understand that the market for credit has 
special features that must be carefully analyzed in order to better understand aggregate 
phenomena. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) clearly state the problem at hand, 
 
“Nobody cares who supplies chairs or steel to a market, or who buys chairs or steel from 
the market. That is one of the wonderful things about competitive markets – they are entirely 
non-discriminatory. 
However, credit is totally different. Supplying credit to John Rockefeller is different from 
supplying credit to Donald Trump or to anyone else. The terms on which credit will be supplied 
will depend on judgements about the likelihood that the loan will be repaid. That depends in 
turn on judgements about the financial position and incentive structures facing the individual or 
firm to whom credit is lent. (…) 
The information problems just described imply that capital markets behave markedly 
different from conventional markets (…) the information problems may easily give rise to credit 
rationing.” (pages 30-31). 
 
Under this reasoning, borrowing constraints are likely to arise and they can be 
understood in two ways: first, credit rationing may be thought as a sign of financial 
underdevelopment, that is, the financial system is unable to find mechanisms to 
overcome information asymmetries and improve credit worthiness. Second, credit 
constraints can be interpreted as a sign of precautionary behaviour that avoids financial 
crisis; in this sense, a too high credit multiplier can be seen not as an indication of a well 
structured and developed financial system, but as revealing a somehow reckless and 
imprudent system that at any time may fail to fulfil its market functions as the share of 
agents failing to pay their debts increases. Banks can contribute to an excessively high 
credit multiplier if, for instance, they adopt an optimistic judgement regarding business 
risks or if they reveal, on any other way, a lack of capacity to assess the true probability 
of default by firms and households. The model to develop below will precisely reveal a 
dynamic behaviour where economies grow faster with a larger credit multiplier until a 
threshold is attained; after this point, instability will prevail, and this result can be 
interpreted as arising from excess of credit in the absence of regulatory measures.    
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In this paper, we are particularly concerned with the relation between financial 
development / borrowing constraints and growth, a theme largely discussed in the 
literature, as in Kyotaki and Moore (1997), Levine (1997), Aghion, Banerjee and Piketti 
(1999) and Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2004), among others. These authors search for 
a relation between the extent of borrowing constraints in an economy and the 
persistence of business cycles. Two papers in particular relate to the analysis we intend 
to undertake: Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2004) and Caballé, Jarque and Michetti 
(2006) propose theoretical frameworks where the growth - cycles - finance setup is able 
to generate endogenous cycles, similar in nature to the ones that are found in the 
analysis of deterministic Real Business Cycles (RBC) models with production 
externalities, as the ones by Christiano and Harrison (1999) and Guo and Lansing 
(2002). The similarity has to do with the fact that it is solely the mechanics of the purely 
deterministic theoretical structure that conducts to the observation of long term 
fluctuations, without the need of considering any exogenous perturbation, which is a 
central feature on the RBC explanation of cycles. 
Our framework considers some original features relatively to the benchmark 
analysis in this field. First, the growth setup corresponds to an endogenous growth 
model; in particular, we take a simple one input AK production function. Second, 
although we consider a generic constraint on credit that is similar to the one in the 
literature [namely, the kind of linear constraint introduced by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989)], we allow for the existence of two kinds of credit: credit to investment and 
credit to consumption. We assume, as well, that the representative agent takes a simple 
rule when determining the shares of borrowing for each possible end; the rule is based 
on consumer sentiment and functions as follows: if the wealth-consumption ratio in the 
economy, in some time moment, is higher than a given benchmark value, then the 
agents become optimistic about future possibilities regarding consumption (they 
perceive that there is room for a future faster growth of consumption relatively to 
wealth), and thus they will attach more credit to consumption and less to productive 
uses (otherwise in the opposite case). 
The simple framework we choose to work with is able to contain various long 
term dynamic outcomes for different values of parameters. Local dynamics analysis 
reveals that bifurcations are likely to occur as we change, for instance, the value of the 
credit multiplier. Global analysis confirms that bifurcations occur, implying the 
transition from a region of fixed point stability to invariant cycles and chaotic motion. 
Our main conclusion will be the one that less constraints on borrowing are growth 
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enhancing until a given point where cyclical motion and, later, instability become 
dominant for an excessively loose credit policy. 
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model; section 3 deals 
with the dynamic behaviour and section 4 contains some final comments. 
   
2. The Analytical Framework 
 
Assume a conventional endogenous growth model, where a representative agent 
maximizes expected utility under an infinite horizon. The objective function of this 
agent is, in moment t=0, 
 
[ ]∑
+∞
=
⋅=
0
00 )(
t
t
t cUEV β  (1) 
 
Parameter β>0 corresponds to a discount factor, ct represents real consumption,1 
and E0 is an expectations operator. The utility function U will take the simplest 
functional form under the usual assumption of decreasing marginal utility, i.e., 
tt ccU ln)( = . The maximization of V0 is subject to a resource constraint that will 
represent the process of wealth accumulation. Wealth dynamics is given by  
 
[ ]tttttt bvcbryw ⋅−−−⋅−=+ )1(1 ,  w0 given. (2) 
 
In difference equation (2), yt respects to income, bt is the amount of financial 
resources available to borrow in moment t, r represents the nominal interest rate and 1-
vt∈(0,1) is the share of available credit that the representative agent chooses to allocate 
to consumption. Note that ct represents overall consumption, and thus tomorrow’s 
wealth corresponds to today’s income less interest payments and less the part of 
consumption that corresponds to resources directly withdrawn from contemporaneous 
output. 
We assume an endogenous growth economy and, thus, income is generated 
through a simple AK production function, yt=Akt, where kt represents physical capital 
and A>0 is a technological index. Considering, as well, that capital fully depreciates in 
each time period, capital will equal investment (it=kt); furthermore, we should regard 
                                                 
1
 This variable, as the following ones, may be understood as a level or as a per capita variable, since we 
do not consider population growth. 
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that the resources available to invest in a given period t are the available wealth plus the 
credit resources directed to the production of final goods, that is, tttt bvwi ⋅+= . 
Therefore, the production function can be rewritten as )( tttt bvwAy ⋅+⋅= . Finally, the 
structure of the wealth constraint becomes complete with the consideration of a credit 
multiplier. Following the literature on this topic, we consider that the available credit is 
a linear function of wealth: bt=µwt. 
Equation (2) is equivalent to the following, 
 
[ ] [ ]tttttt wvcwrAvAw µµ ⋅−−−⋅−⋅+=+ )1()(1  (3) 
 
In our model, we assume that marginal returns are higher than the market interest 
rate (A>r), implying that borrowing resources will be integrally used by private agents. 
An additional assumption is that the representative consumer, when solving the 
optimal program in t=0, takes the expected value of vt as a constant. Consumption 
decisions are taken assuming that the shares of credit allocated to consumption and to 
investment do not vary in the future relatively to an equilibrium expected value vEvt =  
that remains over time. We present this value in the form )(1
2
1
aarctgv ⋅−=
pi
, with 
a∈IR  . 
The previous value guarantees that there is always some borrowing resources 
allocated to both uses, because the following conditions hold, 0lim =
−∞→
v
a
; 1lim =
+∞→
v
a
. 
Observe also that a=0 means that there are equivalent shares of credit for both uses and 
that 5.00 >⇒> va  and 5.00 <⇒< va . 
Solving problem (1) subject to (3) is straightforward. The computation of first 
order conditions implies the following rule of motion for consumption,  
 
[ ] tt cvArAc ⋅⋅−⋅+−⋅+⋅=+ )1()1(1 µµβ  (4) 
 
Under (4), consumption grows at a constant rate over time. Furthermore, looking 
at (3), and assuming that vt is indeed a constant value in the steady state, wealth will 
grow at the same rate in the long run. Therefore, a first relevant result is stated, 
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Proposition 1. In the long term, credit availability is growth enhancing if 
A
r
v
−
−
>
1
1
. In this circumstance, both the growth rate of consumption and the growth 
rate of wealth rise with the credit multiplier. 
 
Proof: Just compute the derivative µ∂∂ /g , with g the long term growth rate. The 
derivative is [ ]vArg ⋅−+−⋅=∂∂ )1(1/ βµ . This is a positive value under the inequality 
in the proposition■ 
 
Note that imposing A>1 is a sufficient condition for a positive relation between 
borrowing capacity and growth. A high level of technology works as a guarantee that 
credit benefits economic performance. 
Although the representative consumer solves the intertemporal problem as if vt 
was a constant share, the agent will end up by breaking her one initial rule. In particular, 
we assume that the agent is sensitive to deviations of the consumption-wealth ratio 
relatively to a benchmark equilibrium value: when the value of this ratio is below the 
reference level, this means that the accumulation of wealth is relatively above the 
predicted value (or, what is the same, consumption is relatively below the expected 
outcome); as a result, the representative agent becomes optimistic in what concerns 
future economic performance and consequently trades some credit to investment for 
credit to consumption. In periods where the consumption-wealth ratio rises above the 
perceived equilibrium value, consumers sentiment changes as they realize the need for 
taking precautionary measures, and this pushes the representative agent to increase the 
value of share vt. 
We define ttt wc /≡ψ  and consider a benchmark value ψ  (which will correspond 
to the steady state ratio to be derived below), and adopt the following share rule, 
 

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2
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t
t aarctgv  (5) 
 
Some comments regarding the shape of (5) are in order. First, there is a time lag in 
the relation between the consumption-wealth ratio and the share of credit to 
consumption. This is explained by the idea that individuals take one time period to 
adjust their borrowing allocation decisions as a response to the evolution of economic 
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aggregates’ values. Second, there is a relation of opposite sign between 1−tψ  and 1-vt; as 
we have previously remarked, when consumption rises above ‘normal’, the agent 
becomes pessimistic or increasingly prudent and as a result less credit will be directed 
to consumption (as the agent expects the consumption-wealth relation to return to 
‘normal’ in the following time periods). Third, when ψψ =
−1t , we have 
)(1
2
11 aarctgv ⋅+=−
pi
, an expression that is equivalent to the one presented above for 
v . Fourth, the new parameter, κ, is positive, and it obeys to condition κ>-a. Fifth, the 
lower boundary of share 1-vt is no longer 0; with (5), we have 






−⋅+∈− 1);(1
2
11 κ
pi
arctgvt . This is a slight change, in the sense that taking a 
relatively high level of κ, the lower boundary will be close to 0; for instance, 
021.0115 =−⇒= vκ  and 003.01100 =−⇒= vκ . 
Figure 1 presents the relation between the consumption-wealth ratio and the credit 
share. We display two panels. The one in the left respects to credit to consumption and 
the one in the right to credit to investment.2 
The representative agent derives a consumption evolution rule by assuming a 
constant vt, but in practice she violates this rule, and therefore the dynamics of wealth 
are characterized by (3) and (5). Hence, the equation of motion for the consumption-
wealth ratio comes  
 
t
tt
t
vArA
ψ
ψµµ
βφψ ⋅
−⋅−⋅+−⋅+
=+ )1()1(1  (6) 
 
with vArA ⋅−⋅+−⋅+≡ )1()1( µµφ . Condition φ>0 is required to guarantee a positive 
steady state value of the consumption-wealth ratio. 
Taking equation (6) and a version of (5) one time period ahead, we get a two-
dimensional system with two endogenous variables, from which the dynamics of the 
described economy can be studied. Such an analysis is the subject of the next section. 
For now, we just relate the level of barriers to credit with the long term share of 
consumption out of wealth. 
 
                                                 
2
 All the figures are presented in the end of the paper. 
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Proposition 2. The same condition that makes credit availability growth 
enhancing, implies that the steady state consumption-wealth ratio is as much larger as 
the higher is the credit multiplier. 
 
Proof: Defining the steady state as the locus where vvt =  and ψψψ ==+ tt 1 , it is 
straightforward to realize that a unique steady state exists for the already presented 
equilibrium credit share and for φβψ ⋅−= )1( . Computing the derivative µψ ∂∂ / , we 
understand that ψ  rises with µ if 
A
r
v
−
−
>
1
1
■ 
 
A sufficient condition for lower credit constraints to work in favour of a more 
favourable consumption-wealth relation (from the consumer’s point of view, of course) 
is that A>1. Hence, high technology levels allow borrowing availability not only to 
stimulate growth, but also to stimulate increased levels of long run consumption. 
 
3. Dynamics 
 
3.1 Local Dynamics 
 
Take the pair of equilibrium values ),( vψ  and linearize the derived system in the 
vicinity of this point. The linearized system is  
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The trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix are, respectively, β/1)( =JTr  
and βφpi
µκ
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
= )1(
)1()()( 2a
AaJDet . The trace is a value higher than 1;3 the determinant is 
positive as long as A>1. 
 
Proposition 3. Stability results are as follows: 
                                                 
3
 For reasonable values of the discount rate of future utility, the trace will be higher but close to 1; for the 
sake of our analysis, we exclude discount rates equal or above 100%, meaning that 1/β<2. 
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a) Convergence to the steady state is guaranteed under 
βφpi
µκβ <
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
<− )1(
)1()(1 2a
Aa
; 
b) Saddle-path stability requires βφpi
µκβ −<
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
<+− 1)1(
)1()()1( 2a
Aa
; 
c) Instability prevails under )1()1(
)1()(
2 βφpi
µκ
+−<
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
a
Aa
 or 
βφpi
µκ
>
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
)1(
)1()(
2a
Aa
. 
Bifurcations occur at the following points: 
d) βφpi
µκ
=
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
)1(
)1()(
2a
Aa
 (Neimark-Sacker bifurcation); 
e) βφpi
µκ
−=
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+ 1)1(
)1()(
2a
Aa
 (Fold bifurcation); 
f) )1()1(
)1()(
2 βφpi
µκ
+−=
⋅+⋅
−⋅⋅+
a
Aa
.
4
 
 
Proof: To prove the conditions in the proposition, we just have to solve the 
stability system, 0)(1 <− JDet ; 0)()(1 <+− JDetJTr ; 0)()(1 <++ JDetJTr . If 
these three inequalities hold, then condition a) is found. Bifurcations d), e) and f) are 
encountered when strict equalities replace each one of the upper inequalities 
respectively. Finally, saddle-path stability arises for 0)()(1 >+− JDetJTr  and 
instability takes place under 0)(1 >− JDet  or 0)()(1 >++ JDetJTr  ■ 
 
Note that under condition A>1, we tighten the range of possible stability 
outcomes; specifically, only Neimark-Sacker or fold bifurcations become possible. 
Figure 2 displays the stability results by drawing a simple diagram relating trace and 
determinant.  
 
3.2 Global Dynamics 
 
                                                 
4
 According to Medio and Lines (2001), p. 160, in this case we cannot refer to a flip bifurcation because 
although one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is equal to -1, one of the required conditions for a 
flip bifurcation fails to hold; namely, Tr(J)∈(-2,0) is not observed. 
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Local dynamics, as depicted in figure 2, reveals that a relatively large set of 
stability results are possible depending on parameter values. Adding an analysis of 
global dynamics further results are revealed.  
We can only proceed with an analysis of global dynamics by considering 
numerical examples. Therefore, we choose an illustrative particular case. Let β=0.96 (a 
discount rate of 4.17%), r=0.03, a=-1 (this value means that three quarters of the 
equilibrium borrowing capabilities are directed to investment: 75.0=v ), κ=15 (a 
sufficiently high level in order for the upper limit of vt to be close to 1), and A=10 (since 
A>1, we restrict the analysis to the case where the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is 
positive). The credit multiplier will be the bifurcation parameter, that is, we allow its 
value to vary in order to perceive how the bifurcations take place and how they impact 
on our endogenous variables’ behaviour. We must also choose the initial values v0 and 
ψ0; the first is irrelevant in terms of dynamic results; the second may provoke slight 
changes on the basin of attraction. In our specific example, we consider ψ0=0.5.5 
Figure 3 presents the bifurcation diagram relating to share vt. The occurrence of a 
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is evidenced and we regard that areas of chaotic motion 
alternate with cycles of various periodicities. Figure 4 represents the long term time 
series of this share for a value of financial development for which endogenous 
fluctuations exist (µ=7). Because the behaviour in time of the consumption-wealth ratio 
depends on vt, then this ratio will exhibit as well endogenous cycles.6  
To confirm the presence of chaos for given values of µ, observe figure 5, that 
displays Lyapunov characteristic exponents (LCEs). These are a measure of exponential 
divergence of nearby orbits, a well accepted description of systems exhibiting chaos. A 
positive LCE in a two-dimensional system reveals the presence of chaotic motion, and 
we observe that such condition holds for some values of µ.  
   
                                                 
5
 There is a result that seems apparently odd when we choose the above set of parameter values. We have 
stated that the economy grows in the long run at rate 1−βφ . In our example, assuming for instance µ=7 
(a value that we will regard to give place to endogenous fluctuations), then φ=64.04 and thus the 
economy would grow at a rate of 6,047.84% per period. However, this is not really a problem; it is just a 
question of scale. If we say that the economy grows at some rate γ different from the one above, then ct 
and wt are not the original variables that truly characterize the economy’s behaviour. These would be 
t
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==ψ , the system under analysis is 
exactly the same for one or for the other set of variables. 
6
 The figures relating to global dynamics are drawn using IDMC software (interactive Dynamical Model 
Calculator). This is a free software program available at www.dss.uniud.it/nonlinear, and copyright of 
Marji Lines and Alfredo Medio. 
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4. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
The proposed model of growth and financial development produces meaningful 
results, with relevant policy implications, that we now systematize: 
1) The higher the level of technological development, the better the economy is 
able to profit from credit availability. In fact, our setup establishes a link between the 
financial sector and the effort related to R&D activities. Only strong technological 
capabilities produce the ability for a higher credit multiplier to increase the long run 
growth rate and the steady state consumption–wealth ratio. Therefore, our first policy 
result respects to the necessity of creating an environment capable of developing 
simultaneously the financial sector and the production of ideas and techniques. 
2) Stability requires a mild condition (the first condition in proposition 3). This 
means that extreme values of parameters tend to compromise stability; for instance a too 
high or too low long term allocation of credit to one of the two possible uses does not 
favour a stable result. 
3) The bifurcation diagram in figure 3 indicates that an exaggerated availability 
of credit leads first to cycles of increasing amplitude and finally to an unstable outcome 
where all credit is allocated to production and no credit goes to consumption. This may 
be interpreted as a case in which a financial crisis occurs and consumers become totally 
risk averse. They will not borrow at all to increase today’s levels of consumption. 
4) Our main result is that the myopic attitude of consumers (that maximize utility 
in order to get a constant rate of consumption growth while simultaneously responding 
to economic fluctuations to support borrowing decisions) is the central source of 
eventual business cycles. In this sense, cycles are self-fulfilling and are truly the result 
of the consumer sentiment more than the result of the functioning of financial markets. 
Nevertheless, given that different levels of available credit produce distinct stability 
results, public authorities will have knowledge of the fact that consumer sentiment will 
lead to pronounced business cycles only for some financial conditions; other financial 
scenarios are robust to the behaviour of private agents.    
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Figure 1 – The dynamics of credit shares. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Stability analysis in the Trace-Determinant diagram. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Bifurcation diagram (vt;µ). 
1/β Tr(J) 1 
Det(J)=1 
Det(J) 
1+Tr(J)+Det(J)=0 
1-Tr(J)+Det(J)=0 
Stability 
Saddle-path 
Instability 
vt 
½-arctg(a)/pi
 
ψt-1 
½-arctg(-κ)/pi
 
1
 
½+arctg(a)/pi
 
1-vt 
1
 
ψt-1 
½+arctg(-κ)/pi
 
On the Allocation of Credit and Aggregate Fluctuations 2 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Time series of share vt (µ=7). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Lyapunov characteristic exponents. 
 
  
